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Abstract 
In England and Wales, there are four main categories of offence surrounding images 
depicting child sexual abuse, those of making/taking, publishing, distributing and 
possession. Despite being in force for almost 40 years, it is argued that now, additional 
regulation is required. In response to technological provision such as private browsing, 
streaming and encryption which are providing investigative difficulties for digital forensic 
analysts, this article proposes the need to implement a fifth offence, one of 'intentional 
accessing' and debates the feasibility and justifications for doing so. This proposal coincides 
with the recent enactment of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which enforces new data 
retention requirements on Internet Service Providers allowing offender Internet connection 
records to be stored for up to 12 months and retrospectively investigated.  
Keywords: Images depicting child sexual abuse; Internet; data retention; Investigatory 
Powers Act; crime 
1 Introduction 
Material that constitutes pornography is subject to debate as attitudes surrounding vulgarity 
vary along with ever-changing levels of tolerance and acceptability in societies (O'Donnell 
and Miller, 2007). The major problem initiated by pornography, is that it has not only 
sexualised the abuse of adults but also that of children who are unable to consent to such 
acts (MacKinnon, 1985). In seeking sexual gratification, an individual does not have free rein 
to seek or produce sexualised material of any type, and many jurisdictions have sought to 
legislate on the type of content that is legally acceptable as a form of imagery. Illegal forms 
of sexual imagery in England and Wales can generally be categorised into two main types, 
images depicting child sexual abuse (IDCSA) (it must be noted that this content should not 
be referred to as pornography (see Horsman (2016) for an elaboration of this discussion)) 
and extreme pornography; the former remains the focus of this article.  
Offences of child sexual abuse often trigger significant public outrage, demonstrated by the 
recent investigations into Jimmy Saville (BBC News, 2014) and Iain Watkins (BBC News, 
2013)). Further, IDCSA which stem from physical acts of child abuse are now arguably 
considered by today’s society as one of the worst form of material that an individual can 
engage with due to the harm it causes to both the child depicted and to society as a whole 
(Silbert, 1989). The concerns raised regarding IDCSA in England and Wales have been 
acknowledged for the past 40 years, leading to the implementation of offences under the 
Protection of Children Act 1978. Now, the Internet has enabled new forms of child abuse 
and provides a platform to view child abuse material with relative ease in comparison to 
before its existence, with IDCSA now widespread online and considered more accessible 
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than ever before (Akdeniz, 2013; Houtepen, 2014; Seigfried-Spellar, 2014; Seto and Ahmed, 
2014).  
2 The Internet and IDCSA  
Seigfried-Spellar (2014) states that law enforcement are now encountering more cases 
involving IDCSA because of the Internet, with new sites hosting this content continually 
being discovered (Powell et al., 2015). Offences surrounding IDCSA are now widespread 
providing a global regulatory problem (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). 
The vast majority of prosecutions for IDCSA now involve images that are found on digital 
storage media in computing equipment (Willmore, 2012) where often they are acquired from 
online sources. In the United States (U.S.), Wolak et al., (2014) identified during the course 
of their study 244,920 U.S. computers shared 120,418 unique known IDCSA on the Gnutella 
peer-to-peer file sharing network. The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children 
Annual Report (NCMEC, 2014) highlighted that in 2014 it received more than 1.1 million 
reports to its CyberTipline, of which 98% surrounded IDCSA, with the organisation reviewing 
28 million IDCSA to assist law enforcement investigations and victim identification. Within 
the United Kingdom (UK), since 2009 over 100,000 offences surrounding IDCSA have been 
recorded (CPS, 2015). Children's charity Barnardo’s sexual exploitation services is reported 
to have witnessed a 22% increase in the number of sexually exploited children in 2011-12 of 
which the majority of cases were linked to the use of the Internet (House of Commons, 
2013). In the UK alone, it is estimated that approximately fifty thousand individuals are 
involved in the acquisition and distribution of IDCSA (CEOP, 2013). The volume of IDCSA in 
circulation has become unmanageable, largely due to the Internet and the regulatory issues 
it causes. Statistics indicate a relatively large number of individuals are being prosecuted for 
possessing or creating IDCSA (Lukas, 2013; CPS, 2015). However, in absence of a 
definitive figure which accurately quantifies both the number of IDCSA in circulation and the 
actual number of individuals involved with them, it is not possible to establish whether these 
prosecution numbers represent all or only a small proportion of those interacting with 
IDCSA.  
2.1 Increased Accessibility and the Development of a 'Non-Contact Offender' 
As of 2015, the Internet has over 3 billion users world-wide (Statista, 2016) where arguably, 
with increased accessibility comes a potential increase in the number of offenders 
interacting with IDCSA online. Statistics show that in 2015, 86% of households in the UK 
have Internet access, with 78% of UK adults accessing the Internet on a daily basis (Office 
for National Statistics, 2015). When combined with lowering device costs, the majority of UK 
households now own a personal computer or mobile smartphone device which offers 
potential access to sexualised content. The fallout from these technological developments 
remains that those who want to engage with IDCSA no longer need to be involved physically 
with acts of child abuse or with those carrying out these acts, effectively creating a non-
contact offender who can passively engage with this material online. The Internet offers a 
seemingly anonymous method of fuelling those who can already be termed as a having a 
fascination with this material (Diez, 2006).  
Non-contact offenders are often dependent on technology in order access and acquire 
IDCSA and as a result, the Internet has now arguably increased the volume of this type of 
offender by allowing a wider audience access to it. The Internet has transformed an offence 
from what would previously have maintained a physical element of child sexual abuse (when 
IDCSA are being produced), to now one where the only evidence of the offence may exist in 
cyberspace as individuals seek out and view hosted imagery online (Merdian et al., 2013). 
Despite providing substantial benefits to society as well as almost single-handedly 
revolutionising modern day living, the Internet has provided a number of facilities for 
accessing and acquiring IDCSA (Balfe et al., 2015). Through websites, forums and peer-to-
peer sharing, the Internet offers an accessible and affordable source of IDCSA in 
comparison to more tangible forms such as magazines, photographs or books which prior to 
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the Internet's popularity formed a predominant source (Balfe et al., 2015). Jenkins (2003) 
argues that although the acquisition of non-electrical forms of IDCSA is now (and has been 
for several years) more  difficult than digital forms due to the ease that digital data can be 
created, replicated and transferred across networks. Further, consideration must also now 
be given to the ‘Deep Web’, a portion of the Internet, which cannot be found using traditional 
search engines. The Deep Web offers access to numerous hidden services, which are often 
cited to have links to IDCSA distribution (Phelps and Watt, 2014). Recently, Moore and Rid 
(2016) identified that the most frequent “use of hidden services through Tor are criminal, 
including drugs, illicit finance and pornography involving violence, children and animals”. 
2.2 The Effect of the Internet and Regulatory Attempts  
The Internet poses the unique issue of causing the user to become disinhibited and more 
likely to access material which they would not normally seek out, providing for an 
“unprecedented degree of inquisitiveness, and the danger is that curiosity hardens into 
deviance” as inhibitions are lost (O'Donnell and Miller, 2007). Similarly it offers a false sense 
of protection and a sense of anonymity to the user as they feel that they are not physically 
identifiable while carrying out their online actions (Horsman, 2016b). Taylor and Quayle 
(2003) highlight that the Internet provides the environment for which a curiosity surrounding 
IDCSA can flourish where individuals can seek out material based on their own interests and 
desires as well as seek communication with self-justifying online communities interested in 
the illegal material (Krone, 2004).  
Calls have been made for Internet service providers (ISPs) to take more of an active role in 
the policing of IDCSA to stem the availability, and, to have more responsibility for preventing 
access to it (Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2013). The introduction of online 
mandatory filters requiring ‘op-in’s’ from customers in order to access certain categories of 
material could soon be implemented by all of the major ISPs in the UK (Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee, 2013). Attempts have also been made in conjunction with Association for 
Payment Clearing Services in the UK to monitor and trace individuals who use their credit 
card details to purchase or access online IDCSA (Davidson et al., 2012). Typically when 
IDCSA is found on a UK based server and reported, its presence will be removed within 
hours, making it inaccessible to other users (Carr and Hilton, 2011). However, such 
response times are not often witnessed when material is hosted abroad leading to the 
availability of IDCSA being prolonged, and in some cases reported websites remained in 
action over 12 months after initial reports were made (Carr and Hilton, 2011). IDCSA may 
also only be hosted for a limited amount of time, long enough to inform offenders so that 
they can quickly download the content before the host site is shut down in order to evade 
regulating authorities (O'Donnell and Miller, 2007).  
As well as the ability to report illicit websites, advances in the reliability of website blocking 
technology (seen since 2006) have made a positive impact on restricting access to IDCSA 
(McIntyre, 2010).  As part of the effort made by the Internet Watch Foundation, the search 
engines Google and Microsoft's Bing now block results for 100,000 search terms in 158 
different languages (BBC News, 2014). Yet changing terminology which is used to reference 
IDCSA remains a constant battle. The acknowledgement of a need to block online content 
has also been discussed in the European Parliament. Directive 2011/92/EU on ‘combating 
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA’, article 25 states that member states should take 
prompt action to remove illegally hosted material and may implement blocking techniques to 
restrict access to online content. Despite moves towards regulating IDCSA, it still remains in 
circulation online making it difficult to control and penalise offenders. Section 3 provides an 
analysis of the current legal regulations in force in England and Wales for prosecuting those 
involved with IDCSA. 
3 Existing IDCSA Regulations 
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Baroness Strange stated, “although we enjoy liberty, we must not allow the edges of 
decency to be eroded into licentiousness” (House of Lords, 1988). Acts that constitute a 
crime change over time, geographical location and the development of public morals and 
values (Silverman and Wilson, 2002), with a similar transition visible within England and 
Wales. It was not until the 1970s that involvement with IDCSA was widely regarded as 
inexcusable and such material began to enter the public consciousness as media coverage 
increased (Jenkins, 2003). Involvement with such material is now widely subject to 
significant stigmatisation, and, viewed as indefensible, signifying society’s want for such 
offences to be punished by law and the need for legislation to prohibit IDCSA. 
Individuals associated with these child sex abuse offences are often classified as 
paedophiles, a term which evokes strong opinions. Paedophiles are defined as those who 
are sexually attracted to pre-pubescent children and/or material depicting such individuals 
and are frequently considered “the bogeyman of our age” (Silverman and Wilson, 2002). The 
word itself strikes fear and outrage into many members of society, sparking emotive 
reactions and public frenzy against those who are associated with the term. Child abuse 
offences have now reached such a heighten state of disgrace that even misinformed and 
propagandised information is enough to spark prejudicial public acts (Silverman and Wilson, 
2002). Silverman and Wilson (2002) attribute the rise of public outrage against paedophilia 
and child offences in the UK to the abduction and murder of Sarah Payne in 2000 (BBC 
News, 2001) and the campaigns by the News of the World which followed in order to ‘name 
and shame’ convicted paedophiles. Similarly the difficulty of identifying, preventing and 
punishing those who are involved with IDCSA, have increased society’s anxiety (Ryder, 
2002). Acts of public violence, community unrest and vigilantism against potential suspects 
are regularly witnessed even in cases following negligent and erroneous media reports 
(Jewkes and Andrews, 2007). 
Although developments surrounding the regulation of illegal imagery and sexualised content  
in England and Wales have existed since the late 1950's with the Obscene Publication Acts, 
the main offences surrounding IDCSA can be found in the Protection of Children Act 1978 
(PCA78) and Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA88). These statutes implement the following 
four core offences. Under the PCA78 Section 1(1), it is illegal to take (or permit to be taken) 
or make an IDCSA, to distribute or show an IDCSA and to publish IDCSA. Following the 
CJA88, having possession of IDCSA was also prohibited under Section 160. Although 
piecemeal developments through case law and further legislative enactments have occurred 
throughout the last 28 years, these four fundamental offences have remained persistent. 
The problem caused by this lack of expansion is that technology has developed to offer 
numerous services and provision which allow an individual to operate outside the confines of 
these current restrictions, largely through the Internet.  
3.1 A summary of Problem Areas 
To provide a brief contextualisation of the problems currently posed under the current 
regulations in England and Wales, the following point is initially raised.  
As it stands in England and Wales, an individual can only be prosecuted for IDCSA related 
offences if an IDCSA is actually found during an investigation. At which point it can be 
determined which of the four offences they are subject to. To clarify this point, to be liable for 
possession of IDCSA, an actual image must be found during an investigation and only then 
can possession be determined. Similarly to be liable for making/taking, distributing or 
publishing IDCSA, the IDCSA which was subject to these actions must be identified. 
Although this may seem sensible it must be considered against the volatility of digital data 
and the ease of which it can be destroyed. It is argued that the act of intentionally accessing 
IDCSA in order to view the content is wrong (with arguments for this point supplied in 
Section 3.1.1); yet English law does not acknowledge this. With this point in mind, it should 
be highlighted that there is currently no offence in English law of intentionally accessing 
IDCSA. It is argued that this is an omission in regulations in this area as IDCSA are likely 
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accessed for sexual gratification, which is arguably achieved when viewed. There should be 
no requirement for an individual to possess, make, distribute or publish IDCSA before an 
offence is committed, and intentional accessing should be an act also regulated, and is 
called for by this article.  
Patrolling the act of intentional accessing is also suggested as a response to technological 
developments, particularly, problem technologies such as in-private browsing sessions, 
streaming facilities and encryption. These techniques can now allow an individual to access 
and view IDCSA online without leaving behind sufficient evidence to prosecute for the 
current offences under the PCA78 and CJA88, and their impact on these offences is 
discussed in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of this article. Internet services now provide the ability 
to view IDCSA online but never possess or acquire it on their local device. In essence, a 
user can now view IDCSA online without leaving tangible evidence of a photograph behind 
on their local device, which can be found during an investigation to prosecute an individual.  
Before examining the impact of developments in technology on IDCSA offences, arguments 
for the need to regulate those who intentionally access IDCSA are proposed and examined. 
3.1.1 Proposed Reasoning for an ‘Intentional Accessing’ Offence 
The implementation of an offence of intentionally accessing IDCSA will impact an already 
strained workload of existing law enforcement and associated organizations dealing with 
IDCSA. Therefore, in order to consider the development and implementation of an offence of 
this type, the following justifications for its potential enactment are debated. 
i. As we increase the net, we find more involved in IDCSA 
A substantial issue surrounding IDCSA online is the inability to quantify and therefore 
effectively regulate it. Reports indicate that increasing volumes of IDCSA are being 
discovered, where the Internet Watch Foundation (2016) reported a 417% increase in 
reports of IDCSA from 2013 and 68,092 reports confirming IDCSA URLs, a 118% increase 
from 2014 to 2015. There are two potential reasons for increased rates of discovery. First, 
there may be greater engagement with IDCSA online and therefore more is being 
discovered due to more being available. Second, requisite bodies and authorities now have 
more resources and power to look in more detail at the actions occurring online in relation to 
IDCSA. Hamilton (2011) states, as we increase the resources dedicated to identifying 
involvement in IDCSA we discover more cases, and since April 2014, the Internet Watch 
Foundation has had powers to proactively search for IDCSA online as well as reactively 
respond to reports (Earl, 2016). Regardless of which of the above points remains the most 
accurate (and potentially both to varying degrees), ‘a widening of the net’ in terms of how we 
regulate online IDCSA with a move to prohibiting access can allow the appropriate 
authorities to increase their understanding of how IDCSA is created and disseminated 
online, and, of those who engage with it. From a greater understanding, an inference is 
made that relevant authorities can develop more effective regulatory strategies with a 
potential to identify a greater number of child victims and remove them from harm. In turn, 
prohibiting access may make it possible to interrupt the hosting and dissemination of IDCSA 
online, which may affect the number of individuals who subsequently possess or 
disseminate this material further. In addition, as Babchishin et al., (2015, p2) state ‘the ease 
of access to online child pornography may contribute to a new group of offenders who 
succumb to temptations that they would have otherwise controlled’. Prohibiting access to 
IDCSA and the deterrent of having an offence of this type may prevent or stem the 
development of such an offender group and prevent those who harbour a curiosity for 
IDCSA from becoming involved with it.       
ii. An inference that those who seek it, must then want to abuse children 
A point frequently mooted by research surrounding child sexual abuse offenders is whether 
those who interact with IDCSA online will then carry out physical acts of child sexual abuse. 
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Currently, there is no definitive answer (Aslan et al., 2014; Seto et al., 2010), only inferences 
that those who seek sexual gratification from viewing IDCSA must also by process of 
association be interested in acting out such fantasies. Babchishin et al., (2015, p2) highlight 
that the ‘prevalence of sexual interest in children is higher among child pornography 
offenders than among typical, contact sex offenders against children’ drawing reference to 
their earlier research (Babchishin et al., 2011). In studies by Hanson and Babchishin (2009) 
and Seto et al., (2010) 12.2% of IDCSA offenders were identified as having a history of 
contact offending (Merdian et al., 2016). Further, online offenders ‘were also found to have 
greater sexual deviancy’ (Babchishin et al., 2015). There are many factors to consider which 
may indicate a likelihood of re-offending or cross-over offending from imagery to physical 
abuse, including psychological disorders, life experiences and physiological makeup 
(Houtepen et al., 2014; Babchishin et al 2014; Eke and Seto, 2012). Research has not yet 
been able to provide a clear answer, but concerns have been raised. Regulating access to 
IDCSA may highlight individuals who are on a path to carrying out physical acts of child 
sexual abuse. In turn, it may only highlight those who have intentions to remain non-contact 
offenders. Failing to regulate access to IDCSA remains a risk, one which cannot yet be 
accurately evaluated and in turn has be considered against limited resources and 
additionally incurred costs by law enforcement to control such actions (the feasibility of 
which is discussed throughout Section 4).      
iii. Should we not acknowledge technological developments and prohibit it? 
Many countries have taken steps to patrol IDCSA in terms of possession, distribution, 
creating and publishing. In doing so, there is an acknowledgement that these acts are wrong 
and therefore in need of regulation. However, consideration must be given as to the 
underlying motivations for these regulations. At the heart of many arguments is the harm 
caused to the child, both physically and mentally. Possession of IDCSA is prohibited as the 
image itself depicts an illegal act, one which is both harmful to the child depicted but also 
arguably to society as a whole. Given this, the question must be asked, ‘is it too big of a step 
to take to also regulate access to IDCSA?’. Arguably IDCSA is sought by an individual in 
order to achieve some level of sexual gratification from it, and this is likely achieved when 
viewed. Take for instance, the situation of two individuals, one who views IDCSA online (but 
the image is never stored on their local device – see discussion of private browsing and 
streaming in Sections 3.2 and 3.3), and the other who views an image previously acquired 
on their PC (no evidence to raise a making charge). The current legal position in England 
and Wales defines that the second individual likely commits an offence because they 
possess the content subject to a legal test of possession (see R v Porter [2006]  [2006] 2 Cr. 
App. R. 25), but permits a ‘passive look’ by the first individual. This appears an arbitrary 
discrimination between these two acts, which at the core, still involve an individual seeking 
out IDCSA and driving demand for it.  
Intentionally accessing IDCSA within the confines of this article is a proposed offence 
derived from technological developments fundamentally changing the shape of an offence. 
Technology now offers access to IDCSA without needing to possess or create the content. 
The motives of an individual who accesses IDCSA may be similar to that of a potential 
possessor, to seek sexual stimulation from the imagery. Yet the law in England and Wales 
currently arguably arbitrarily distinguishes between an individual who captures the content of 
the image on their local device and another who does not. Despite this, both sets of 
individuals drive the demand for IDCSA, regardless of whether they seek to possess or just 
view it, the content in both cases has to be created, present and hosted online to see. 
Failing to regulate access to IDCSA indirectly suggests that only those who seek to possess 
(or create, distribute and publish) IDCSA are perceived as encouraging demand for it, which 
is arguably not accurate.  
Canadian legislation has already taken steps to distinguish the act of intentional accessing 
from that of mere possession. Section 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-
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46) defines and accessing offence carrying a maximum 10 year sentence, with Section 
163.1(4.2) stating that ‘a person accesses child pornography who knowingly causes child 
pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, himself or herself’’. The regulation of those 
who access IDCSA was introduced into Canadian law in 2002, following an acknowledge-
ment of the importance of Internet Service Provider information and its use in tracking of-
fenders (Library of Parliament, 2009; Smyth, 2007). Although Canadian statistics dissecting 
prosecutions by offence type to assess the number of prosecutions obtained under the ac-
cessing offence could not be identified (see equivalent CPS (2015, p93) statistics), the ac-
cessing offence has remained in force for over 15 years and forms part of a set of regula-
tions put in place to stop any form of interaction with IDCSA and prevent child sexual abuse 
of this type (Bailey, 2007). Given that steps have already been taken to acknowledge the act 
of intentionally accessing IDCSA in foreign jurisdictions, it is argued that legislation in Eng-
land and Wales should do the same.  
 
iv. A chance to respond to technology instead of react  
The proposal of an accessing offence provides an opportunity to respond to developments in 
technology (see Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 below for detailed examples of technological 
issues) in order to continue to regulate IDCSA. As societal perceptions of online 
confidentiality change, privacy enhancing technologies are now more prevalent. When 
coupled with potential access to IDCSA online, it is not beyond possibility to witness a shift 
in IDCSA where there is no longer a need to possess IDCSA and offenders can simply just 
view content online without leaving a trace on their local device. Such a movement would 
still see a demand for IDCSA, but one where those who are interacting with it are protected. 
Take for instance the situation where every person from this point on decides to access 
IDCSA online but never possesses or download a copy of an image to their local machine 
where they may become liable to prosecution, instead opting to revisit a particular site 
hosting IDCSA. In such a situation, it is unlikely that law enforcement would deem this a 
satisfactory state of affairs, given that IDCSA would still be in existence and in demand 
online. An implemented accessing offence presents an opportunity to proactively tackle the 
fight against IDCSA instead of waiting and reacting to potential shifts in offender behaviour. 
v. The child - is it right not to support the child by preventing access to the material? 
The question must be raised as to whether the appropriate authorities and organizations are 
under a moral obligation to support child victims of produced imagery by prohibiting access 
to it. It is argued that child victims are vulnerable to suffering psychological harm at the 
thought of the images documenting their abuse being subject to scrutiny online from others 
(Michaels, 2008; Martin and Alaggia, 2013). With this acknowledgment, it may seem morally 
right to take steps to avert access to IDCSA in order to prevent further harm to child victims. 
An accessing offence may not only play a role of deterrent, but also provide some solace to 
child victims knowing that the level of regulation around IDCSA prohibits this act, potentially 
supporting any rehabilitation processes and stopping further harm. 
vi. Closing the loop 
Regulations surrounding IDCSA in England and Wales currently cover four core actions, but 
omit to address what this article is proposing as a need for a fifth and final stage to the set of 
regulations in this area. Prohibition of access is a move which provides an individual seeking 
IDCSA with no room to manoeuvre. By closing a perceived loophole, there is no method left 
to an individual in which to interact with IDCSA which would not result in a breach of law. 
With no scope to interact with IDCSA, there is potential to impact and lessen the production 
and volume of individuals interacting with it. 
To demonstrate the issues posed by technology driving the proposal offered in this article, 
in-private browsing sessions, streaming facilities and encryption are analysed below and 
their impact on IDCSA investigations. 
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3.2 Private-Browsing Sessions 
One of the key challenges posed by the Internet and its associated services is that users 
now have the ability to view IDCSA online whilst leaving minimal trace of this action behind 
on their device. It is typically these devices which are seized and subsequently examined 
during an investigation, providing the primary source of evidence from which to base a 
prosecution attempt. However, techniques such as private browsing are designed to allow 
users to access content online without the need to download and store it. This is achieved 
by preventing cached website data and history records from being stored locally, leaving 
behind minimal traces of a user’s online actions. 
3.2.1 An Example: How Private Browsing Works in Practice 
The Internet browser market is dominated by both Google Chrome and Mozilla’s Firefox 
browsers (W3Schools, 2016), with both offering private browsing functionalities. Private 
browsing is a fairly recent addition to Internet browser applications, designed for users who 
seek to privatise their actions whilst browsing online and limit the amount of information 
regarding their browsing sessions being stored on their local device. Although different 
Internet browsers implement their private browsing functionality differently, the aim remains 
the same; to prevent information being retained regarding what they have done on-line. This 
often means that any subsequent forensic investigation of a private browsing session is 
likely to recover a lot less data than if a standard browsing session had been carried out 
(Magnet Forensics, 2016).  Records of search history, online website addresses and cached 
content are often not found on the system (some remnants may be discovered in 
unallocated areas of a system), with some data left behind in physical memory (a form of 
volatile memory used by all computers where content is purged every time the power is 
removed to the device – i.e. when it is shut down).  
The result of these sessions means that despite accessing a website hosting IDCSA online, 
finding data during a forensic investigation indicating this act may not be possible. As a 
result, we have a scenario where a defendant has accessed IDCSA and likely obtained 
sexual gratification from it, an act that is not prohibited within the confines of the current 
offences surrounding IDCSA.  
3.2.2 What is the Impact of Private Browsing? 
The impact of private browsing is that those who access IDCSA online via private browsing 
sessions are unlikely to have IDCSA automatically downloaded to their PC and stored in 
their cache (a process which occurs during normal browsing), which would leave an 
individual potentially liable for a possession or making offence (subject to evidence of 
intentional searching) under the range of offences stated in the PCA78 and CJA88. When 
using private browsing it is likely that no IDCSA which the user has accessed online will be 
present on the device. Further, there may even be no evidence of Internet history records 
showing where an individual was looking online despite having accessed this content. 
3.3 Media Streaming 
Streaming protocols provide the second area of concern. Transmission of media content 
across the Internet frequently takes place in one of two ways; direct download or via media 
streaming protocols, where the difference between methods has an impact on the current 
offence of possession and making/creating IDCSA. A direct download of a media file occurs 
when a request is sent to a host server, at which point the media in question is sent to the 
clients’ machine and stored on their local storage device, typically some form of hard drive 
(Sobh, 2008). In comparison, those who stream media via the Internet simply access the 
content on the host server, where they are able to view or listen to the content without 
having to wait for the content to download to their machine. In fact, streamed media may 
never be stored on the clients’ computer and it is this fact that currently makes it difficult to 
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prosecute under the current range of IDCSA offences in England and Wales (Sobh, 2008) 
(owners of the stream will likely fall within the confines of existing creation, distribution / 
publishing offences). As with the issues noted above with private browsing, streaming 
protocols may leave little evidence of the streamed media behind on an individual’s device 
from which a forensic investigation can interpret. This may be particularly troublesome if a 
user streams media from within a private browsing session.  
In the case of streaming a user is actually accessing the media content where in most 
cases, there is limited evidence of the streamed content in order to infer possession or 
making of IDCSA. At this point it is necessary to place a caveat on the statement above. 
Evidence left by streaming is often subject to the streaming protocol in use. Some streaming 
protocols buffer small quantities of data which are cached to the local machine, as seen with 
progressive downloading protocols (Begen et al., 2011). Such methods are designed to 
increase the users experience and performance of the stream, where fragments may be 
recoverable (for example, small Flash Video (.flv) files in the browser cache) with YouTube 
having adopted this protocol for its media streaming platform (Begen et al., 2011) (although 
adaptive streaming protocols are now favoured).   
By taking a look at the definitions of the acts involved in the offences surrounding IDCSA it is 
possible to see how streaming currently fails to fit. Possession denotes a state of having 
ownership or control, which a person streaming media has neither in regards to the 
streamed content. Further, as often no content relating to the stream may reside on the local 
machine, a suspect cannot be said to have made an additional form of IDCSA. Instead, 
accessing (defined as “the ability, right, or permission to approach, enter, speak with, or use; 
admittance” (Dictionary.com, 2016)) is the term which describes best the acts of interacting 
with a media stream. Here a user has the ability to use the stream, yet at no point do they 
possess the stream other than visually.   
3.4 Encryption  
Encryption techniques provide the final area of concern highlighted in this article. Encryption 
involves the obfuscation of information via a computational algorithm, often implemented for 
purposes of security and protection of information (Microsoft, 2014). Encryption can also be 
implemented for malevolent purposes, particularly to hide the remnants of a digital crime. 
Digital storage media holds data in a binary format, which is interpreted by computing 
software and transformed into a format, which is visually understandable. Encryption 
software can take this data and scramble the contents using mathematical algorithms 
rendering it unreadable (Chatterjee, 2011). Without an encryption key, (essentially a 
password used to reverse the algorithm returning the data back to its original state) content 
remains in an unreadable state (Sherwinter, 2006). Encryption provides the user with privacy 
and protection for their data, ensuring that should it get lost or stolen, it cannot be easily 
acquired or abused. There are strong arguments for the legitimate use of encryption and 
Microsoft; a leading organisation in computer software manufacturing now provides users 
with full disk encryption (encrypts the entire system hard drive) facilities since the production 
of their Windows Vista, 7 and 8 operating systems (OS). However, conversely encryption 
provides a defendant with the ability to obfuscate illicit material and place it beyond the 
reach of authorities. For the digital forensic analyst, an opportunity to acquire or crack the 
password and decrypt the information may have significant time constraints. Sherwinter 
(2006) highlights that finding the correct encryption key to decrypt encrypted data can take 
upwards of 2 billion years utilising technology, which at the time of writing in 2007 was 
standard. Since then, despite computing power improving, encryption standards have 
increased leaving a similar problem. The problem encryption presents in relation to IDCSA 
remains that those who implement it effectively could prevent an effective investigation into 
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IDCSA and ultimately preventing law enforcement officials from establishing whether an 
offence surrounding IDCSA has been committed.  
The UK Government introduced The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) in 
order to regulate surveillance techniques and the interception of communications (Akdeniz et 
al., 2001). However this legislation provides a key tool for preventing offenders from 
escaping conviction through the use of encryption techniques (Chatterjee, 2011). Part III of 
RIPA is of particular interest given these developments in computing technology and 
determining whether a suspect is in possession of illicit material. A brief synopsis of Part III, 
specifically section 49 RIPA provides public authorities with the power to compel the 
disclosure of any encryption keys where it is believed the suspect is in possession of such a 
key. In simple terms, this part of RIPA addresses the issues of obligatory decryption of data 
(Palfreyman, 2009). Section 49(2) RIPA allows a public authority to issue a notice of 
compliance to disclose the encryption key where there is reasonable grounds to believe that 
a key to the protected information is in the possession of any person. Section 53(5) RIPA 
states failure to comply can result in a two-year prison sentence or in cases of IDCSA, five 
years (as introduced by the Policing and Crime Act 2009). This section of RIPA raises a 
number of questions to address. The problem encryption raises is that subject to password 
disclosure or breaking the encryption, any evidence stored on an encrypted device cannot 
be accessed. Encryption is designed to obfuscate data, leaving no indication of what is 
contained upon the device, making prosecution for possession and making/creating IDCSA 
practically impossible.  
The three technologies discussed above bear one thing in common, they all potentially 
prevent any IDCSA which an individual has accessed and viewed from being discovered 
during an investigation. Yet, evidence of what IDCSA an individual has accessed using 
these provision may still be available from Internet Service Providers. This has led to the 
proposal for implementing an offence of accessing to combat these issues.  
 
4 A Call for a New Offence: 'Intentional Accessing' 
This article calls for the development of a fifth offence, one of 'intentional accessing IDCSA' 
to add to those existing under the PCA78 and CJA88. An intentional accessing offence is 
offered as a method for combatting troublesome technologies such as those discussed 
above. Although there are conflicting reports as to whether viewing encourages contact 
offender or prevents it (Houtepen, 2014; Long, et al 2012), it is argued that there is an 
implicit link and preventing access to IDCSA closes what can be perceived as an existing 
gap in legislation. Further, an intentional accessing offence will allow for the prosecution of 
those engaging with IDCSA, but that fall outside of current regulations. The problem here is 
that IDCSA are primarily produced to offer some form of sexual satisfaction to the viewer. 
This is arguably obtained when the images are accessed and viewed, where there is no 
longer a requirement to save and store these images for later use (which would 
subsequently make the offender vulnerable to prosecution for making or possession of 
IDCSA) if the user chooses not to do so. It can also be seen as a method for stemming the 
production of new material and a deterrent for those currently involved or considering it.    
The act of viewing is defined as 'the action of inspecting or looking at something' (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016). When looking at IDCSA, analogy is drawn to the act of window 
shopping, where a person can look at content but never engage in a transaction where they 
are deemed to have taken possession of any items. In addition, a similar shift in culture is 
witnessed with legitimate pornography, where access to this material via streaming, as 
opposed to purchasing copies of the material, is now a common process. In context, it 
remains currently viable for individuals to source IDCSA hosted online, view it, and providing 
none of that content is downloaded to their local device (cached by their Internet browser) or 
that it is encrypted and beyond current powers of recovery, operate outside of current 
offences defined in England and Wales under the CPA78 and CJA88. Although just viewing 
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IDCSA online may seem like a victimless crime, this is inaccurate, with Michaels (2008) 
stating that harm is caused to the original child victim depicted in the image because of the 
knowledge that the image is in circulation with the potential to be viewed, providing a strong 
motive for implementing an accessing offence. Similarly, by failing to prohibit acts of viewing, 
there is no deterrent for the act, potentially indirectly driving the production of new material to 
be hosted online. In addition, it may encourage a shift in culture surrounding IDCSA, where 
a movement towards the development of ‘view only’ (content which can be accessed and 
seen, but not downloaded or acquired) images may be seen as a means to evade current 
legal regulation. Therefore those who are only accessing IDCSA to view it should be 
regulated. 
Seigfried-Spellar (2014) indicates 'viewers are individuals who did not intentionally or 
knowingly download any pornographic images of minors; instead, these individuals admitted 
to searching for and accessing websites in order to view online child pornography'. Although 
these individuals view the material online, this paper champions the terminology of 
‘accessing’ when defining the offence, for the following reasons. First, access can easily be 
established objectively via Internet connection records (now facilitated by the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 – see discussion in Section 4.1). Second, in technical terms a user 
accesses material which ultimately leading to the user viewing the material presented to 
them on screen. Therefore the term access is preferable to that of viewing to prevent debate 
arising around whether a suspect has actually visually seen an image on screen. 
 
4.1 How to Implement an Accessing Offence: - The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
In November 2015, the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (DIPB) was presented to the UK 
Parliament, designed to replace the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. The 
UK Parliament stated that the DIPB “would provide a framework for the use of investigatory 
powers by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, as well as other public 
authorities. The draft Bill included provisions for the interception of communications, the 
retention and acquisition of communications data, the use of equipment interference, and 
the acquisition of bulk data for analysis” (Parliament.uk, 2015). The focus of the DIPB was 
the regulation of communication untaken by criminals and terrorists by allowing their online 
actions to be examined and the implementation of powers to intercept, collect and analyse 
communication traffic. The DIPB was subject to public, academic and industry pre-legislative 
scrutiny (DIPB, 2015, pp.1) and attracted significant media attention, and criticism, having 
been attributed the name ‘Snoopers’ Charter’ due to its implementation of powers of 
surveillance (BBC News, 2016). Despite concerns, on November 29th 2016, the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA16) received royal assent, bringing into force the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016.  
Of particular interest to the facilitation of the offence of intentional accessing proposed in this 
paper is the communication data collection and retention requirements. To provide insight on 
what communication data consists of, the DIPB (pp.12) stated that “communications data is 
information about communications: the ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘with whom’ of a 
communication but not what was written or said”. One of the focuses of the IPA16 are ICRs. 
IRCs are records of what user’s access online (records of website visits etc.) and are 
gathered by ISPs (referred to as Telecommunications Operators in the IPA16, see Section 
261(10)) and under the IPA16, IRCs must be maintained by ISPs for up to 12 months. The 
IPA16 places the same obligations on all companies providing services to the UK or in 
control of communications systems in the UK (DIPB, pp.30). Essentially, this regulation 
offers law enforcement the ability to evaluate a suspect’s conduct online across this period 
of time and retrospectively analyse their actions. 
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The powers for data retention in the IPA16 have been met with controversy with suggestions 
that its measures are invasive, encroaching on an individual’s right to privacy and allowing 
law enforcement to 'snoop' (BBC News, 2015). Yet a public consensus poll undertaken in 
2014 by research agency TNS  showed 71% of the 1195 people questioned 'think the 
government should prioritise reducing the threat posed by terrorists and serious criminals 
even if this erodes peoples’ right to privacy' (TNS, 2014). A critical assessment of the 
IPA16’s content and application is beyond the scope of this article, where focus must be 
drawn to how this legislation can support the implementation of an intentional accessing 
offence for the regulation of IDCSA. 
4.2 How can the IPA16 Support the Regulation of those Intentionally Accessing 
IDCSA? 
The value of using online communication data for detecting and prosecuting those involved 
in IDCSA cannot be underestimated, where in some circumstances it may be the only way to 
identify an offender (DIPB, pp.12). The DIPB provided the following insight into the 
importance of intercepted communication data for the purpose of supporting law 
enforcement to identify and prosecute those involved in child abuse offences.  
From a sample of 6025 referrals to the Child Exploitation and Online Protection 
Command (CEOP) of the NCA, 862 (14%) cannot be progressed and would 
require the provisions in the Investigatory Powers Bill to have any prospect of 
doing so. That is a minimum of 862 suspected paedophiles, involved in the 
distribution of indecent imagery of children, who cannot be identified without this 
legislation. This also means that in some cases law enforcement do not have 
access to essential data regarding an investigation as it has not been retained – 
this includes, for example, the identity of an individual suspected of sharing 
indecent images of children or the people with whom a missing person was last 
in contact (DIPB, pp.25). 
The interception and retention of communication data also played a vital role in the case of 
Iain Watkins, lead singer of the Lost-prophets band, supporting the identification of those 
involved (DIPB, pp.14). The 12 month retention of data period defined in the IPA16 is seen 
as a proportionate response, where countries such as Australia having opted for a retention 
period of up to two years. Further, Paul Lincoln, director for the Office for Security and 
Counter Terrorism indicated that nearly half of requests made in child sexual exploitation 
cases as of 2012 were for data between 10 and 12 months old and was identified as a 
common starting point for investigations (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers 
Bill, 2015a). The debate on the length of the data retention period has raised concerns 
particularly in relation to data privacy and the additional costs incurred by ISPs to store this 
data securely for this period of time. However the need is clear as demonstrated by a survey 
carried out across 64 law enforcement organisations by Michael Atkinson, Secretary to the 
National Police Council’s Data Communications Group who states the following. 
To give you an example, we covered nearly 10,000 pieces of data and 
applications. That is what this survey was about. Nine per cent of those 
applications were for sexual offences. What was interesting was that 37% of 
that 9% of data that we applied for was more than six months old. We would 
say, and you can see, that retaining the data for more than six months is very 
important … 
…What is really interesting is a document produced by the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner's Office on 20 November 2015, only last 
month, which is a breakdown of communications data and applications. It 
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shows over 100,000 communications data applications, 19% of which were in 
relation to sexual offences. Two things jumped straight out at me. First, this is 
a 100% increase from the survey that we did in 2012. Secondly, 37% of 
roughly 19,000 is over 7,000. We would say that, if we retain data for only six 
months, hundreds if not thousands of suspects for sexual offences would likely 
evade prosecution (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 
2015c). 
Further, Detective Superintendent Matt Long of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection 
Command at the National Crime Agency stated that of the potential 1,500 referrals received 
by the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children in the US, the first step in the 
majority of cases was to analyse communication data (Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015c). Further, during Operation Notarise, 745 offenders were 
arrested nationally, where requests for communication data were made with all, resulting in 
the safeguarding of 518 children (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 
2015c). It is worth noting that if retention periods dropped to six months, 60% of these 
offenders would be lost (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015c). Alan 
Wardle, Head of Policy and Public Affairs, NSPCC, indicated that within the UK, 
organisations working the with Internet Watch Foundation are very proactive, often removing 
hosted IDCSA online within two hours. However, the problem remains where foreign 
territories are hosting IDCSA and live streaming acts of child abuse, reported to be 
crowdfunded (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015b). The use of 
retained Internet records is seen as crucial to policing IDCSA online by facilitating the 
identification of those who interact with this material (Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015c). Retention periods of 12 months provide a window of 
opportunity potentially long enough to process investigations in IDCSA and utilize collected 
ICRs to facilitate an intentional accessing offence and track down potential offenders (Powell 
et al, 2015). 
4.3 IPA16, ICRs and an ‘Intentional Accessing' Offence 
Consider the situation where a suspect has been accessing IDCSA online but effectively 
deletes any trace of this activity from their local machine, beyond forensic recovery. Where a 
traditional forensic analysis of a suspect’s device may not reveal the true extent of their 
actions, ISP maintained ICRs are the only option for establishing this content. By retaining 
ICRs the necessary data may be available for tying suspect Internet traffic to an offender 
and what they have accessed online (Home Office, 2014). ICR information can also be used 
to establish intentional browsing behaviour, showing connections to a website initiated by a 
user’s device, including visits to IDCSA hosting websites, supporting the identification of 
those intentionally accessing this content.  
Despite private browsing functionalities protecting data from being stored on the defendant’s 
computer, evidence of their visit to an illegal website (ICRs) is maintained by their ISP (as 
confirmed by Google (2016) Chromes usage policy), who are now required by the IPA16 to 
maintain this content. Essentially, private-browsing functionalities implement what can be 
termed as a ‘locally private’ service, where information regarding their online actions is not 
private from their service provider (BT, SKY etc.). Similarly, those who stream IDCSA 
content either via normal browsing protocols or private browsing are not anonymous and can 
be tracked (subject to the use of anonymisation protocols such as Tor). Essentially an 
intentional accessing offence would provide a two-pronged attack on IDCSA streams, where 
streamers of IDCSA fall under existing legislative coverage (creation / distribution) and the 
individuals streaming the content are prohibited from accessing the content and driving 
demand for it. 
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Finally, where encryption is discovered on a device and the content cannot be decrypted, 
ICRs could potentially indicate the types of content being accessed via the device and 
potentially stored. In all cases, an intentional accessing offence is a method of prosecuting 
those who are viewing IDCSA online but taking measures to ensure this content does not 
become 'findable' during an standard forensic investigation should they be arrested. 
Implementing an intentional accessing offence can be seen as a method for expanding 
current legislative powers in terms of apprehending those engaging with IDCSA. It also 
provides an offence which can be enforced without reliance being placed upon data resident 
on a suspect’s local device, which is subject to being tampered with and destroyed.  
4.3.1 Distinguishing the innocent 
The implementation of an accessing offence would increase the range of acts which may 
incur liability, raising concerns regarding erroneous prosecutions. The act of accessing can 
in theory be committed in the fraction of a second, where intentional and accidental 
‘accesses’ to IDCSA websites must be considered and distinguished with accuracy. As a 
result, to achieve this distinction, an accessing offence needs to examine a defendants 
actions as a whole, considering their course of conduct and therefore consideration of ICRs 
prior to, and, after an access to a website containing IDCSA need to be examined. This may 
show an individual who accesses IDCSA as part of a series of browsed websites of this 
type, or an individual who merely accidentally lands on a website, out of synch with browsing 
habits and then continues normal browsing. Where one may demonstrate a number of ICRs 
to numerous IDCSA hosting sites and links within such domains, an innocent browser may 
only exhibit a single ICR amongst legal websites. By analysing a browsing session as a 
whole, the volume of accesses to IDCSA hosting websites and the pattern of access can all 
be taken into account when considering culpability, as well as a counter argument to such 
acts where this information can be factored into the development of a defence to accessing.  
4.4 Counter Arguments Regarding the Implementation of an Intentional Accessing 
Offence 
Justifications for implementing an offence of intentionally accessing IDCSA have been 
provided in Section 3.1.1; however the practical feasibilities also need to be considered. The 
imposition of a fifth offence involving IDCSA would add additional burden to an already 
limited set of resources available to law enforcement. At present, IDCSA provides regulatory 
issues where the UK government has already acknowledged an inability to process and 
investigate the number of individuals already believed to be involved (HC Deb 4 July 2013). 
Therefore, any decision to implement an offence of this type needs to be considered not only 
against any justifiable need to regulate accessing, but also against whether such an offence 
could be effectively enforced. In turn, given limitations in available resources, it could be 
argued that investment should be directed at targeting acts of physical child abuse as 
opposed to digital offences.   
In addition, an intentional accessing offence would be reliant on the imposition of data 
retention periods under the IPA2016. Now in force, ISP data must be maintained. Acquiring 
access to this information for the purposes of identifying those accessing known IDCSA 
websites may prove troublesome as any analysis must be done securely, whilst ensuring the 
privacy innocent Internet users is not compromised. Processing the data would place an 
additional encumbrance on ISP resources, which are already likely feeling the strain of the 
additional requirements of having to retain the significant volumes of user ICRs for the 12 
month retention period. As a result, securing access and then compliance to evaluate data in 
such a way may prove troublesome and in turn, may heighten public contention for the 
IPA16 and the perceived intrusive surveillance of online behaviour. Enforcement of an 
accessing offence also relies on the accuracy of ICRs meaning that those who take steps to 
mask or utilize ananoymisation services such as Tor are unlikely to be traceable. In such 
cases, an intentional accessing offence may be unenforceable as individuals cannot be 
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identified. However, this limitation currently applies with the enforcement of existing offences 
surrounding IDCSA, where reliance is placed on the accuracy of any information packages 
supplied to law enforcement by ISPs with relation to the tracking of potential distributors of 
IDCSA online. Accuracy issues would also exist in relation to correctly identifying those who 
access IDCSA from the masses of normal Internet user data collected by ISPs under the 
IPA16, where financial and/or criminal liability for misidentification would likely be accrued. 
This additional responsibility of processing IRCs would unlikely be assumed by ISPs and 
therefore would likely provide an additional resourcing issue for law enforcement. 
A final area of consideration lies with the question, should intentionally accessing IDCSA be 
an offence? Arguments for this offence have been offered in Section 3.1.1 but counter 
arguments should be given. In addition, regulatory and resource issues have already been 
addressed, leaving only contemplation of the fundamental act of accessing. As highlighted 
by Pritchard et al., (2016) there is a lack of research which can quantify societal perceptions 
of those who interact with IDCSA and how this act is perceived. Yet, substantial media 
coverage and reported acts of public outrage suggest that IDCSA is generally considered 
abhorrent (Horsman, 2016). Pritchard et al’s., (2016) study demonstrated that a majority of 
surveyed participants perceived the act of viewing IDCSA online as a wrongful act, despite 
being confined to a university student demographic. As of yet, there has been no large scale 
evaluation of public perceptions of the act of accessing IDCSA online and this remains an 
area arguably in need of evaluation.  
5 Concluding Thoughts 
This article calls for the implementation of an offence of intentionally accessing IDCSA as a 
response to technological developments and the Internet, which currently allow individuals to 
access and view IDCSA in a way that may prohibit attempts to prosecute individuals 
engaging in this behaviour under the current range of offences. Functionalities such as 
private browsing and streaming now mean that there is limited evidential data left behind by 
those utilising these options to accessing IDCSA online. Where a suspect uses a device to 
access IDCSA in a way which prevents the image being stored on a suspect’s local device, 
there is no offence of possession or creation. The suspect actions are defined as having 
‘accessed’ IDCSA, which remains an unregulated act. This article offers two contributions, 
first, arguments for the need to implement an offence of ‘intentional accessing’, and second, 
a discussion of the feasibility of implementing an offence of this type and how it can be 
supported by the recent enactment of the IPA2016.  
Such a move can be seen as a 'widening of the net', increasing the scope for prosecuting 
those involved with IDCSA whilst providing a deterrent for those involved in this form of 
material in an attempt to stem the flow of existing content and the production of new 
imagery. 
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